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Psychiatric Genomics and Mental Health Treatment: Setting the Ethical Agenda 
 
*Forthcoming in American Journal of Bioethics 
 
Mental illnesses have a substantial impact on global population health.  Mental, 
neurological, and substance-use disorders, which include schizophrenia, depression, and dementia, 
account for 13% of the global burden of disease (Patel 2013) and this is predicted to rise to 15% 
by 2020 (WHO 2001).  Depression is currently the third largest contributor to the disease burden 
(Patel 2013) and is projected to be the second largest contributor after ischaemic heart disease by 
2020 (WHO 2001).  Comorbid conditions often mean the successful treatment of physical 
illnesses, such as HIV / AIDS, cancer, diabetes, heart disease, will hinge on the effective treatment 
of mental illness (Prince 2007).  Funding of mental health care treatment and research is 
problematically scarce, as research investment and service provision consistently fail to meet 
demand.  In the UK alone the wider economic cost of mental illness is £105bn annually (Campion 
et al, 2012), and, in the US, this figures is estimated to be $467bn (Insel 2015), with half of US 
residents in need of mental health care not being served at all (Lewis-Fernandez et al 2016).  Yet a 
report by the mental health charity MQ revealed that only 5.5% of the UK research budget is spent 
on mental illness in comparison to 19.6% on cancers, translated to £9.75 invested in research per 
person affected by mental illness compared to £1571 spent on cancer research per patient (MQ 
Transforming Mental Health 2015).  In the US, the National Institute of Mental Health revealed 
that in 2006 average expenditure for per person for mental disorders was $1591 compared to 
$5167 for those with cancer (NIMH, Average Expenditures per Person [1996 vs. 2006]).  
Moreover, between 2009 and 2011, the National Alliance on Mental Illness reported cumulative 
cuts of more than $1.8bn from state budgets for mental health services for children and adults 
living with mental illness (NAMI 2011).   
 Chronic underfunding as well as limited progress and outcome data in relieving the global 
burden of mental health has fuelled the re-prioritisation of existing research and treatment 
strategies (Bhui 2016).  Since 2008 the National Institute of Mental Health has prioritised a 
research agenda that focuses on biogenetic causes for normal and abnormal brain function, 
HPSKDVLVLQJWKDWPHQWDOGLVRUGHUVVKRXOGEHWKRXJKWRIDVµGHYHORSPHQWDOEUDLQGLVRUGHUV¶,QVHO
2009).  This agenda channels recent developments in psychiatric genomics which examine the 
genetic causes for certain neurological traits and utilise larger, population-based studies to analyse 
the prevalence of human genomic variation to detect risk susceptibility towards certain mental 
disorders (Merikangas 2003, McClellan and King 2010, Gratten 2014).  Preventative measures can 
then be recommended, either through lifestyle changes or targeted psychotropic drug treatments 
(Seretti and Fabbri 2013).  The explanatory, predictive, and preventative possibilities of genomics 
may encourage a more personalised approach to medicine which enables patients to make health 
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choices that are more closely tailored to their individual circumstances, thus placing psychiatric 
genomics research at the forefront of improving mental health outcomes (Insel 2009). 
With this growing genomic revolution in psychiatry comes shifting normative parameters 
for appropriate clinical interventions for mental disorders.  Thus far, the ethical discourse has 
focused overwhelmingly on the challenges arising in conducting psychiatric genomics research 
(Biesecker and Peay 2003, Mathieu et al 2013), or on rehearsing well-recognised issues that arise 
when applying clinical genetics practice or direct-to-consumer genetic tests within the mental 
health context (Appelbaum 2004, Hoop 2008, Newson 2009, Bunnik et al 2012, Hoge and 
Appelbaum 2014).  Yet, as we go on to show, there are significant ethical challenges in translating 
the findings of these research activities into the clinical and public health contexts.1  In this paper, 
we establish an ethics agenda for psychiatric genomics as it relates to both these contexts: we 
review the main translational challenges, identifying and reviewing three distinct ethical concerns, 
before outlining a novel research agenda to tackle these issues.  Section I examines concerns 
around genetic essentialism which could inadvertently exacerbate stigma against individuals with 
mental disorders.  Section II discusses the promises of genomic medicine, which raises potential 
therapeutiFFRQVHTXHQFHVRI µJHQHWLF UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ H[SORUHG LQ6HFWLRQ ,,, 6HFWLRQ ,9SUREHV
how individualised genomic medicine and public health applications of genomic research could 
together divert attention away from ethical examination of key environmental and systemic factors 
which contribute to mental illness.   Section V outlines the need for an interdisciplinary, clinical 
ethics research agenda to examine the impact of the genomic revolution on mental disorders 
research and treatment.  We further suggest that biogenetic and genomic research into mental 
disorder must work in concert with ethically informed, evidence-based therapeutic interventions 
which do not lose sight of the individual situated within unique environmental circumstances.    
 
I. Genetic Essentialism and Stigma 
 
Biogenetic and genomic research has been used in public health strategies that advocate 
for greater parity between physical and mental illnesses and to combat stigma (Angermeyer et al 
2011).  Stigma remains a major barrier to help-seeking behaviour by individuals with mental 
disorders, as well as their social inclusion within the broader community.  Recent anti-stigma 
LQLWLDWLYHVKDYHOLNHQHGPHQWDOLOOQHVVWRDµEURNHQOHJ¶/XF\DQGRWKHUSK\VLFDOLOOQHVVHV
such as diabetes and cancer (National Alliance for Mental Illness 2009, 1997).  Thomas Insel, 
'LUHFWRURIWKH1DWLRQDO,QVWLWXWHRI0HQWDO+HDOWKUHIHUVWRPHQWDOGLVRUGHUDVDµEUDLQGLVRUGHU¶
                                                     
1
 7KH ZD\ ZH XVH µSXEOLF KHDOWK¶ LQ WKLV SDSHU LV UHODWHG EXW QRW FR-extensive, with population health 
research, the latter of which refers to clinical studies that involve the creation and analysis of large-scale, 
epidemiological datasets.  More VSHFLILFDOO\ZHXWLOLVHWKHWHUPµSXEOLFKHDOWK¶WRGHQRWHWKHSUDFWLFHVDQG
strategies used to translate scientific data (including population-wide genomic research) into practical health 
interventions, for individuals or at-risk population groups. 
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RU µGLVRUGHUV RI VSHFLILF EUDLQ FLUFXLWV¶ 7HG%ORJ   7KHVH FDPSDLJQV VWUess that the 
individual is not to blame for their mental illness and, in theory, biogenetic explanations help 
reduce attributions of voluntary choice, culpability and guilt; challenging the view that personal 
weaknesses and failings cause mental disorder, social exclusion and rejection of those who have 
mental illnesses should decrease as a result (Angermeyer et al 2011). 
However, this hypothesis has not been borne out in practice.  The dubious success of 
biogenetic explanations to combat stigma is attributable to the ways in which assumptions about 
genetic essentialism can sometimes accompany these popular translations of research (Rsch et al 
2010): µ,Q D JHQHWLF-HVVHQWLDOLVW YLHZ ZH DUH RXU JHQHV¶ Phelan et al 2013).  In this context, 
genetic essentialism is grounded in the belief that genes determine our species-membership, and 
our individual identity and characteristics.  There are two critical features embedded within a 
genetic essentialist view: (i) gene determinism (the notion that genes cause 
species/group/individual characteristics); (ii) categories of homogeneity and difference (the notion 
that genes underline the distinctions and commonalities amongst us).  For example, if genomic 
research indicates that racial groups differ based on their genes; from a genetic essentialist 
perspective, then, genes construct individuals as part of a homogenous racial group whilst 
separating them from other racial groups.   
It is important to recognise that genomic research in the scientific field denies essentialist 
FODLPVKLJKOLJKWLQJLQVWHDGWKHFKDOOHQJHVLQFOLQLFDODQGSXEOLFKHDOWKWUDQVODWLRQIURPµEHQFKWR
EHGVLGH¶DQGIURPµEHGVLGHWRSUDFWLFH¶:HDNUDWKHUWKDQVWURQJJHQHWLFH[SODQDWLRQVRIPHQWDO
disorders dominate research results, and complex genotype-phenotype relationships directly 
contradict genetic essentialist beliefs (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011, Rose 2015, Schizophrenia 
Working Group 2014).  Most people conducting research in psychiatric genomics acknowledge 
the importance of the gene-environment interaction in the aetiology of mental disorders, 
particularly in two key dimensions (Rutten et al 2013, Uher 2014): first, socio-economic and 
familial determinants are found to contribute to mental health in important ways.  Country of birth, 
gender, poverty, adverse childhood experiences and stress, can all make individuals vulnerable to 
disorders (Saxena 2007, Hatzenbuehler et al 2013, Barnett et al 2012, Ehlert 2013, Read and 
Bentall 2012).  Second, research into epigenetics highlights how environmental factors shape gene 
expression dynamically (Zhang and Meaney 2010, McGowan and Szyf 2010, Sonuga-Barke 
2010), further indicating the possible reversibility of epigenetic functions (Hunter 2012, Kubota et 
al 2012)  $FFRUGLQJ WR =KDQJ DQG 0HDQH\ µHQYLUonmentally driven changes in neuronal 
transcriptional signals could potentially remodel the methylation state of specific regions of the 
'1$ >« ZKLFK@ FRXOG LQ WXUQ SURYH HVVHQWLDO IRU VXVWDLQHG DOWHUDWLRQV LQ V\QDSWLF IXQFWLRQ¶ 
(Zhang and Meaney 2010).  Thus, research into the macro- to micro-level causes of mental 
disorder, from global health factors to individual epigenetic responses, all emphasise the close 
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V\QHUJ\ EHWZHHQ HQYLURQPHQW DQG JHQHWLF LQIOXHQFHV VXFK WKDW µWKH HIIHFWV DW RQH OHYHO FDQ EH
RQO\EHXQGHUVWRRGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKHRWKHU¶(Zhang and Meaney 2010). 
Yet, popular translations of genetic and genomic research have mixed results: on one 
hand, these can evoke essentialist views, leading to negative effects for people with mental illness 
within society: the notion of the human genome as the essence of human life and nature, ascribed 
ZLWK D FDXVDO DJHQF\ WKDW VHHPV WR IXQFWLRQ LQGHSHQGHQWO\ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V ZLOO KDV JDLQHG
popular traction (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011).  Scientific findings are translated as confirming 
strong genetic explanations for mental disorders, suggesting that assumptions of genetic 
essentialism are difficult to displace (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011).  On the other hand, it is shown 
that public perception about genetic essentialism is decidedly more complex, contradictory, and 
non-uniform, with numerous factors influencing public attitudes toward genetics, such as 
educational levels, social and cultural context, gender identity, perceived personal benefits and 
harms, and applicable practical, clinical and research uses (Condit 2010, Condit 1999).  Indeed, 
DQDORJLHVRIDJHQHWLFµEOXHSULQW¶DUHRIWHQXQGHUVWRRGLQDSUREDELOLVWLFQRQ-absolute rather than 
deterministic manner (Condit 1999, Condit et al 2001).   
&RQGLW¶VUHVHDUFKULJKWIXOO\GUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRPXFKQHHGHGQXDQFHWRWKHLVVXHRIJHQHWLF
essentialism in the public translation of scientific findings.  There are nonetheless important 
ethical consequences which remain from the ways that biogenetic approaches shape 
understandings of mental disorder and those diagnosed with these disorders.  Importantly, Condit 
does not examine the consequences of biogenetic explanations in the mental health context, 
though her survey of linkages between race-targeted genetic interventions and health do indicate 
an increase in lay perceptions of genetic determinism and race-based discrimination even as such 
strategies are considered useful in accelerating practice-based applications of genomics by medical 
researchers (Condit and Bates 2005).  This dual-edged sword emerges likewise in the mental 
health context, perhaps understandably given that both ideas of race and mental illness have pre-
existing, value-laden connotations which likely impact the interpretation of genetic explanations in 
such contexts (Condit and Bates 2005).  On one hand, it can be seen that biogenetic explanations 
of mental illness help mitigate public perceptions of personal responsibility, yet simultaneously the 
same explanations can deepen stigma of individuals with mental disorders in other worrying ways. 
For example, studies have repeatedly indicated that biogenetic attributions of mental disorder 
heighten public perceptions of immutability, dangerousness, otherness, and unpredictability, 
exacerbating social distance and discrimination as a result (Read et al 2006, Schomerus et al. 2014, 
Pescosolido et al 2010).   
These translational issues are not isolated solely to public perceptions but affect diagnosed 
individuals and their self-perceptions in problematic ways.  As well as worsening social stigma, 
biogenetic framing of mental illness has been shown to generate self-stigmatising, negative 
attitudes amongst individuals diagnosed with mental disorders (Lebowitz and Woo-kyoung 2014, 
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Rüsch et al 2010).  Contrary to the anti-VWLJPD LQLWLDWLYHV LVRODWLQJ WKH GLVRUGHU ZLWKLQ RQH¶V
inherited genes, brain, or body, can heighten subjective feelings of guilt, blame, and shame.  For 
example, biogenetic framing of depression, eating disorders, schizophrenia has been shown to 
entrench assumptions about persistence, chronicity, and prognostic pessimism (Deacon and 
Grayson 2009, Easter 2012, Lebowitz et al 2013, Rsch et al 2010).  Individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia quite understandably prefer psychosocial as opposed to biogenetic interpretations of 
their disorder, given that genetic and genomic foci in mental illness has tended to perpetuate public 
and self-stigma (Holzinger et al 2003).  As we will see in the next section, the ethical 
consequences of genetic essentialist assumptions are not confined to stigmatising ways of 
understanding mental disorder, but generate pressing ethical issues surrounding its treatment at the 
clinical level.    
 
II. The Promises of Genomic Medicine 
 
Regardless of its questionable success as an anti-stigma tool, genomics is increasing in 
prominence due to its potentially transformative approach towards the clinical treatment of mental 
disorders.  The complex aetiology of mental disorders has meant that treatments are often reactive 
as opposed to proactive.  Most individuals are diagnosed and treated once behavioural symptoms 
RIPHQWDOGLVRUGHUHPHUJHRIWHQLQDQDFXWHSKDVH$V,QVHOH[SODLQVµ>W@KHJRRGQHZVVWRULHVLQ
medicine are early detection and early intervention.  If we waited until the heart attack, we would 
EHVDFULILFLQJPLOOLRQOLYHVHYHU\\HDULQWKLVFRXQWU\WRKHDUWGLVHDVH7KDW¶VSUHFLVHO\ZKDW
ZHGRZKHQZHGHFLGHWKDWHYHU\RQHZLWKRQHRIWKHVHEUDLQGLVRUGHUVKDVDµEHKDYLRUDOGLVRUGHU¶
± we wait until the behaYLRU EHFRPHV PDQLIHVW¶ 7HG%ORJ   %XW JHQRPLF PHGLFLQH FDQ
potentially apply the same preventative strategies in place for certain physical illnesses to the 
domain of mental health care so that interventions take place prior to the development of acute 
behavioural symptoms.  
*HQRPLFPHGLFLQHDSSOLHVDQLQIRUPDWLRQDOPRGHOWRHQVXUHWKDWWUHDWPHQWLVµSUHGLFWLYH
SUHYHQWDWLYH SHUVRQDOLVHG DQG SDUWLFLSDWRU\¶ +RRG   8VLQJ JHQRPH-wide associations 
generated through large population-wide sample collections, genomic medicine can start to 
identify possible ways to assess and help prevent the development of potential health risks.  
Molecular markers help indicate early stages of a disease even before symptoms appear.  As the 
Personalized Medicine Coalition state, genomic medicine signals a movement away from reaction 
WR SUHYHQWLRQ 30&   *HQRPLF PHGLFLQH LV DOVR µSHUVRQDOLVHG¶ LQ WKDW LQWHUYHQWLRQV DUH
intended to be adapted specifically to the genetic make-up of particular individuals.  Such 
personalisation does not necessarily mean new treatments, devices, or drugs that are created 
specifically for the individual.  Rather, clinicians classify individuals into smaller superfamilies or 
subpopulations with particular molecular markers to indicate (i) reactions to particular 
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pharmacological treatments and (ii) susceptibility towards certain diseases.  In this way, genomics 
KHOSVFRQFHQWUDWHRU µVWUDWLI\¶SUHYHQWDWLYHRU WKHUDSHXWLF LQWHUYHQWLRQV WR WKRVHZKRZLOOEHQHILW
(Juengst et al 2012).  That clinicians can treat individuals with more precision and fewer side 
effects as a result of enhanced knowledge about potential reactivity to certain pharmacological 
treatments does not encourage a more participatory clinical model, since patients still rely on the 
FOLQLFLDQ¶V H[SHUWLVH  5DWKHU JUHDWHU SDWLHQW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG LQGLYLGXDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ HPHUJHV
with the potential for genomics to identify disease susceptibility.  Patients are encouraged to be 
proactive in informing themselves about their genetic data, making lifestyle, treatment, and health 
care choices to compensate for genetic risks, and seeking access to appropriate treatments (PMC 
2014).  The use of genomic data in treating mental disorders can therefore potentially empower 
patients to make better informed, responsible, autonomous decisions towards their mental health. 
But the discourse of empowerment and participation in genomic medicine raises two key 
ethical issues when applied to treating mental disorders.  First, how personal, genetic 
responsibility is framed requires closer scrutiny, particularly as it could potentially undermine 
psychosocial therapeutic approaches and the clinician-patient therapeutic alliance: well-recognised 
features of contemporary mental health practice that are beneficial to patients.  Second, the 
application of genomics to broader public health interventions risks shifting attention away from 
critical analyses of ways in which inequitable socio-economic, political, and cultural structures can 
directly impact on mental health care.  We discuss these in turn in the next two sections. 
  
III. Recovery and Genomic Responsibility 
 
Closer examination of the narrative of individual empowerment in genomic medicine 
reveals a double-edged sword: on the one hand, the deterministic bias within genetic essentialism 
can lead to subjective UHVLJQDWLRQRUIDWDOLVPWRZDUGVRQH¶VELRORJ\XQGHUPLQLQJWKHGLVFRXUVHRI
individual empowerment within genomic medicine (Lebowitz 2014).  There has been a paucity of 
research focusing on the subjective impact of biogenetic explanation amongst those with a clinical 
diagnosis of mental illness in contrast to the number of studies exploring the complex picture 
underlying public perceptions of genetic determinism.  As one of the first studies in this area, 
(DVWHU¶VTXDOLWDWLYH DQDO\VLVSUREHG VXEMHFWLYH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIELRJHQHWLF DWWULEXWLRQV IRU
eating disorders.  Her results confirmed the results of other quantitative studies indicating that, 
whilst blame and guilt for the disorder diminished when biogenetic explanations were adopted, so 
too did self-SHUFHLYHGDJHQF\ LQ WKH UHFRYHU\SURFHVV 2QHSDWLHQW LQ(DVWHU¶V VWXG\VSHFXODWHG
WKDWELRJHQHWLFVZRXOGKDYHµEHHQDQHQDEOHU¶IRUGLVRUGHUHGEHKDYLRUZKLOVWDQRWKHUVWDWHGWKDWLW
would encouUDJHKHUWRVD\µ³2K,FDQ¶WFRQWUROWKLVDVPXFK %HFDXVHLW¶VELRORJLFDO ,W¶VLQ
P\ JHQHV 6R WKHUHIRUH , FDQ¶WFRQWURO LW´¶ (DVWHU :KDW WKHVH VWDWHPHQWV UHYHDO LV WKDW
these deterministic attitudes may not be isolated to genetic causal explanations, but likewise 
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emerge from the genomic IRFXVRQSDWKRSK\VLRORJ\WRLGHQWLI\DQLQGLYLGXDO¶VULVNSUREDELOLWLHVRI
developing certain mental disorders.  That particular mental disorders are thought to be heritable 
could contribute to views that certain outcomes are predetermined, leading to a sense of genetic 
fatalism.  Risk susceptibility comes to mean risk inevitability, irrespective of their environment or 
behaviour, thus perpetuating a self-fulfilling prophecy which may inhibit help-seeking behaviour 
(Phelan 2006, Easter 2012).  Prognostic pessimism rather than optimism tends to accompany 
genetic essentialist assumptions amongst those diagnosed with mental disorder, thereby reducing 
the motivation to actively engage and contribute to the therapeutic alliance in treatment.  Both 
optimism and active involvement in treatment has been shown to be crucial to constructive 
outcomes and effective recovery from mental disorder (Meyer et al 2002, Horvath and Luborsky 
1993). 
On the other hand, with genomic medicine comes a heightened sense of subjective genetic 
responsibility, as individuals are expected to become informed and act appropriately based on such 
knowledge revealed through genomic testing.  Novas and Rose explain: 
 
In this process, the subject of the genetic consultation was increasingly addressed as an 
autonomous individual making informed and responsible choices in a process of self-
actualization.  This was the individual who was confronted with the range of new choices that 
developments in bio-medicine had placed before them.  Such individuals had to make complex 
decisions concerning their own life and the lives of their actual or potential off-spring in the 
light of new genetic knowledges, and in the light of a range of new techniques such as prenatal 
testing, pre-implantation diagnosis and the abortion of foetuses thought to carry, or potentially 
to carry, genetic pathologies.  The good subject of the genetic consultation thus becomes the 
individual who will modify their lifestyle responsibly LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKHLU JHQHWLF ULVN  >«@
Thus we can see that the subject that is fabricated in the contemporary genetic consultation is 
not merely a subject at genetic risk, but also a responsible subject who exercises choice wisely. 
(Novas and Rose 2000) 
 
,Q WKLV ZD\ WKH UHVSRQVLEOH VHOI LQ WKH DJH RI JHQRPLF PHGLFLQH LV PRGHOOHG DIWHU WKH µUDWLRQDO
FRQVXPHU¶ZKRLVµHQWHUSULVLQJSUXGHQWHQFRXUDJLQJWKHFRQGXFWRIOLIHLQDFDOFXODWLYHPDQQHU
by acts of choice with an eye to the future and to increasing personal well-being and that of the 
IDPLO\¶ 1RYDV DQG 5RVH 7KLV PRGHO RI UHVSRQVLEOH VHOIKRRG HQFRXUDJHV LQGLYLGXDOV WR
prevent the onset of illness through proactive pharmacological treatments, pre-emptive 
interventions, lifestyle changes, as ZHOODVFUHDWLQJDQREOLJDWLRQWRDFWLQUHODWLRQWRRQH¶VIDPLO\
and future, especially since genetics stress heritability of disease from one generation to the next 
(Novas and Rose 2000).  Responsible individuals would volunteer and choose to undergo genetic 
testing and counselling should other family members have heritable conditions.  At present, no 
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clinical genetic tests can reliably predict whether one will develop serious mental illness, such as 
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.  Genomic testing can, at best, calculate probabilities of one 
developing a particular condition based on large population-wide samples (Hippman et al 2013).  
Some progress has been made in identifying risk alleles (Schizophrenia Working Group 2014) 
though these are currently too uncertain or poorly understood to assist in genetic counselling 
(Gershon and Alliey-Rodriguez 2013, Hippman et al 2013).  There is nonetheless growing focus 
on ways that genetic counselling may enable individuals to equip themselves with genomic 
inforPDWLRQDERXWWKHLUDQGWKHLUIDPLO\¶VULVNRIGHYHORSLQJFHUWDLQPHQWDOGLVRUGHUV,QJOLVHWDO
2015, Gershon and Alliey-Rodriguez 2013). 
This PRGHO RI WKH VHOI DV µUDWLRQDO FRQVXPHU¶ LV GHHSO\ FRQWHVWDEOH IURP DQ HWKLFDO
perspective.  Of particular importance for our discussion is the way in which its implicit notion of 
VXEMHFWLYH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LPSDFWV RQ WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V VHOI-understanding as well as the clinician-
patient relationship.  On the surface, the development of genetic testing and counselling has also 
EHHQ DFFRPSDQLHG E\ WKH ODQJXDJH RI DXWRQRP\ DQG µQRQ-GLUHFWLYHQHVV¶ ZKLFK PHDQV WKDW
decisions should be made by the patient based on his or her own values and beliefs.  At a deeper 
level, however, the individualistic turn in genomic medicine suggests that the treatment encounter 
has an instrumental function for the patient: all the necessary information is supplied to the 
rational consumer/patient, and they make appropriate, prudent decisions based on the probability 
of risks (Harvey 2010, Juengst et al 2012).  This shifts focus away from the treatment itself to how 
an individual responds to information.   
In the first place, genomic medicine could potentially narrow the scope of treatments 
towards mainly pharmacological interventions.  Studies have revealed two trends: first, genetic 
results for a modifiable medical risk or diagnosis have been shown to alter perceptions about how 
the condition is to be effectively controlled, towards drug-based interventions as opposed to 
equally, if not more, efficacious behavioural or environmental change (Marteau et al 2004).  
Second, clinicians were more likely to push for pharmaceutical drug treatment as opposed to 
psychotherapy when disorders could be attributable to biogenetic causes (Lebowitz and Woo-
kyoung 2014).  Moreover, individuals could be held accountable for making imprudent, 
irresponsible, choices following genomic testing.  Even as genomic medicine increasingly offers 
patient-FHQWUHG FKRLFHV WKHUH DUH LPSOLFLW SUHVVXUHV WR EH µSUXGHQW¶  6KRXOG WKH\ µUHVLVW WKHLU
making up as health-FUHDWLQJSHUVRQVDQGIDLOWRPDNHWKHµULJKW¶KHDOWK\FKRLFHV¶WKHQWKH\DUH
µPDUNHG RXW DV LUUHVSRQVLEOH DQG KHQFH XQILW WR EH VHOI-JRYHUQLQJ FLWL]HQV¶ ZKR PD\ HYHQ
relinquish their right to healthcare (Harvey 2010).  These issues raise further concerns as to 
whether a genomic approach to mental disorder risks (i) overemphasising pharmacological 
treatments and (ii) fetishizing a punitive concept of responsibility which, rather ironically, 
contributes to the blaming, stigmatising attitudes towards those with mental illness.  Studies 
indicate that genetic explanations of mental disorder tend to increase stigma of the disorder and 
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social isolation and distance of the individual in public perceptions, and more crucially, reduce 
empathy, understanding, and patience amongst mental health clinicians (Lebowitz and Woo-
kyoung 2014).  This latter finding is significant, given the importance of a strong, therapeutic 
alliance between clinician and patient for treatment adherence, social inclusion, and long-term 
recovery prospects.  In sum, with genetic essentialist assumptions, individuals with mental 
disorders are feared and separate; without them, they are potentially culpable and blameworthy for 
failing to be proactive in preventing the onset of their disorder.  
These problems are symptomatic of a lack of clarity surrounding the compatibility of 
genomic treatment approaches to current evidence-based, psychosocial treatments for mental 
disorder.  The concept of genomic responsibility is vulnerable to instrumentalising and 
oversimplifying the therapeutic encounter (Drake et al 2009), and thus conflicts with recovery-
oriented, psychosocial interventions in problematic ways.  Genomic medicine assumes that 
individuals have, or are willing to gain, insight into their potential health and associated risk-
factors; it assumes that the internal resources typical of the rational consumer are readily available 
to agents.  But these assumptions are questionable for a number of reasons.  First, insight might be 
lacking, simply because behavioural symptoms for certain disorders are often triggered by 
adversity and stress, combined with subjective difficulties adapting (what researchers call 
µUHVLOLHQFH¶'DY\GRYHWDO0RUHRYHUWKHVHDVVXPStions disregard the fact that much of 
the therapeutic process is aimed towards precisely the development of greater subjective insight, 
self-understanding, self-acceptance, and adaptive agency.  In this sense, psychosocial treatments 
are often reactive, but they also have intrinsic and developmental, rather than simply instrumental, 
functions.   
This LV FDSWXUHG ZHOO LQ (DVWHU¶V VWXG\ ZKHQ RQH ZRPDQ GHVFULEHV WKH SLWIDOOV RI
biogenetic explanations of eating disorders:  
 
I feel like that would lead to peoplHMXGJLQJ\RX«/LNHLWEHLQJDQLQKHUHQWSDUWRI\RX$QG
MXVWSHRSOHODEHOOLQJ\RXDV³2K7KDWSHUVRQLVDEXOLPLFSHUVRQ´«LWZRXOGMXVWNLQGRILQ
WKHEDFNRISHRSOH¶VKHDGVWHDFKWKHPWRPDNHVQDSMXGJPHQWVDERXWEXOLPLD$QGMXVWDVVXPH
that theUH¶VDQHDV\FXUH«/LNHLW¶V OLNHDVKRW <RXJHWDVKRW $QG\RX¶UHFXUHG 2UMXVW
VRPHWKLQJOLNHWKDW%XWEXOLPLD\RXGRQ¶WFXUHLWOLNHWKDW,W¶VWKRXJKWSDWWHUQV$QGLWWDNHV
a long time to cure.  You have to re-train yourself how to think.  And you also have to re-train 
your behavior how to eat.  And it takes time.  (Easter 2012) 
 
Moreover, whilst psychotropic drugs have been shown to be beneficial for schizophrenia, research 
has indicated the importance of accompanying psychosocial interventions in order to address 
residual impairments in social functioning and help with medication adherence (Bustillo et al 
2001, Turkington et al 2006, Westermann et al 2015, LeVine 2012).  Psychosocial therapeutic 
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approaches utilise narrative validation, encourage experiential reflection, and engage in 
constructive questioning in order to cultivate healthy internal resources amenable towards 
treatment adherence, long-term recovery, and better social integration.  Recognition of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VXQLTXHFKDUDFWHULstics and life experiences is vital for the success of this therapeutic 
process (LeVine 2012).  The interaction requires sustained personal engagement, levels of trust, 
where therapists are thought to be genuine, non-judgemental, and interested in the unique 
experiences of the individual (Jung 2015).  This enables individuals to situate their disorder within 
a broader biographical narrative, to help make sense of the self and at times, participate in the 
reparation of the fractured self through altering ways of thinking, behaving, perceiving others and 
the world (Singer 2013).  In this respect, the therapeutic process itself cumulatively and 
constitutively facilitates greater self-understanding, empowering individuals so they can assume an 
active role towards recovery.  In treating a variety of disorders, such as depression, eating 
disorders, personality disorders etc., psychosocial approaches stress the importance of 
understanding environmental, experiential causes, so that individuals are equipped with adequate 
coping mechanisms and volitional agency, whilst eschewing self-blaming, self-stigmatising 
narratives which could undermine these developing volitional skills.  In this way, treatment is 
RIWHQ D GLIILFXOW SURFHVV EXW DOVR FRQWULEXWHV WR LQGLYLGXDOV¶ VHnse of achievement, particularly 
when they recover.   
Thus, treatment of mental disorder requires personalised medicine, but not in the way that 
is championed by genomic medicine.  Whereas the personalised dimension of genomic medicine 
stresses general lifestyle advice and guidance about SUREDEOHULVNVEDVHGRQRQH¶VJHQHWLFPDNHXS
the general and reductive nature of these therapeutic engagements can undermine the recovery 
goals of self-understanding and volitional control.  The complex aetiology of mental disorders 
means personalised treatment must consider the complex dynamic between environmental, 
experiential, and biological factors.   
 
IV. The Importance of Environment in the Public Health Prevention of Mental Disorders 
 
The individualised focus of genomic medicine increasingly makes mental disorder and its 
treatment a personal issue.  Though this personalised focus of genomic medicine has been thought 
to conflict with traditional public health approaches (Khoury 2011), there has been a growing 
move to explain and justify the central role of public health as a mediator between research and 
practice at the clinical level.  Recent public health approaches work in concert with genomics, 
integrating and applying large-data, genome-wide association studies and epidemiological 
analyses to identify key strategies to improve public and individual health (Khoury 2016).  
Researchers have set the following translational agenda for public health: 1) ensure that genomic 
technology has a net positive health impact on the at-risk population groups and to serve as an 
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unbiased intermediary between stakeholders in practice; 2) utilise data collection on health impact 
to assess the added value or disvalue of personal genomic tests and applications; 3) evaluate 
population health data sets and determine the benefits of using genomic tools to aid additional data 
collection on health impact (Khoury 2011).  In principle, then, public health approaches have a 
critical translational role in terms of guiding the future use and application of genomic data for 
personalised, individual treatment for mental disorder (Gill et al 2010, Moore et al 2011). 
 But there are ethical concerns associated with this agenda.  According to the World Health 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ µPHQWDO KHDOWK DQG PHQWDO LOOQHVV E\ and large are viewed as residing outside the 
SXEOLFKHDOWKWUDGLWLRQ¶ODUJHO\GXHWRLWVPXOWLIDFWRULDOFDXVHVZKLFKUHTXLUHYHFWRUVRIKHDOWKDQG
illness to be conceived more as a spectrum rather than dichotomy (WHO 2001).  The difficulty in 
integrating the mental health agenda within public health has contributed to the continuing lack of 
parity between mental and physical treatments.  It is unclear whether the increasing genomic focus 
in public health can help address this challenge adequately.  In the context of mental disorder, the 
dual shift towards (i) personalised genomic medicine; (ii) integrating genomics into public health 
approaches, could together inadvertently shift focus away from the necessary amelioration 
environmental factors which impact on mental illness.  From one direction, genomic medicine 
µUHORFDW>HV@ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU KHDOWK FDUH DZD\ IURP VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO UHDOPV DQG RQWR WKH
VKRXOGHUVRISDWLHQWV¶IXUWKHUµLQGLYLGXDOLVLQJ¶UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUKHDOWK-XHQJVWHWDO)URP 
the other direction, the increasing focus on genomics in public health approaches risks side-lining 
the socio-cultural-economic aspects of mental disorder further.  Yet, numerous studies indicate 
that barriers to mental and physical health treatment parity relates strongly to environmental issues 
of surrounding societal stigma, unequal distribution of wealth and resources, and gender 
inequality.  Alongside biological factors, research has revealed that socio-economic factors can 
also be important contributors to both childhood and adult mental health illnesses.  One review 
study further found that children from socioeconomically disadvantaged families were two to three 
times more likely to develop mental health problems compared to more advantaged families (Reiss 
2013, Shonkoff et al 2012).  Links between children developing psychosis or schizophrenia and 
low socioeconomic households have also been shown (Wicks et al 2005).  And, whilst the 
connection between exposure to physical or sexual childhood abuse and adult psychopathology is 
well established, there has been indication that this correlation is even stronger in women than in 
men (MacMillan et al 2001).  For example, gender-specific issues, such as violence against 
women, economic deprivation, limited control over reproductive health, and cultural values were 
likewise revealed to be important factors in postnatal depression in Goa (Patel et al 2002).  
Research into epigenetics further substantiates the important influences of both biological and 
environmental factors, where the close interplay between genetic predisposition and 
socioeconomic and cultural context has been shown to determine the epigenetic expression of 
genes, and subsequently the onset of mental illness (Zhang and Meaney 2010).  
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This observation should give rise to caution when promoting the individualised discourse 
of genomic medicine in its present form within public health forums.  In the first instance, the 
areas of empowerment associated with this type of medicine remain largely unavailable to 
individuals in certain circumstances: genomic testing and prevention does little to address the deep 
ethical and political issues associated with children who grow up in socioeconomically deprived 
families, or women who experience sexual and physical abuse.  The discourse of individualised, 
personalised genomic medicine is risky in that it potentially restricts the focus of public health 
interventions to the level of whether individuals have access to genomic testing, diverting attention 
away from pressing systemic issues surrounding gender and socioeconomic inequality which, as 
major causes of mental illness, demand closer critical ethical scrutiny.  Whilst the WHO is 
optimistic that a public health approach can help achieve the goals of improving global mental 
health and parity between physical and mental health treatments (WHO 2001), the complexity and 
depth of this challenge demands an increasingly multifaceted approach which goes beyond 
genomics ± one which draws upon normative resources from clinical ethics and political 
philosophy, as well as those embedded within social scientific research and public health 
strategies.   
 
V. Priorities for Future Research 
 
 It is clear that the genomic revolution is becoming increasingly important in the field of 
mental health as it promises to inform the development of new ways to help prevent and treat 
mental disorders.  Public health approaches have begun to integrate this research into their policy 
recommendations.  This is evidence of a genuine attempt at translating genomic research to the 
µEHGVLGH¶ DQG FOLnical practice.  However, if this research is to be translated in ways that are 
appropriate and most likely to accrue the putative benefits offered by genomic evidence, the 
process of translation needs to be complemented by ethics research to examine its potential impact 
on individuals with mental illness, and how any ethical concerns may be addressed.  The 
discussion above suggests four areas should be prioritised in such ethics research:  
 
1) Translation:  There needs to be effective, bi-directional translation between genomics and 
genetics research and mental health practice.  Public health approaches are increasingly asserting 
their role in disseminating and functioning as the mediator of the impact of genomic research on 
care and treatment pathways for people with mental disorders.  But deeper ethical reflection must 
accompany this chain of communication ± from scientific research to public health policy to 
clinical practice ± so that ethical issues which emerge from the clinical practical level of mental 
health treatment likewise inform the distinct (but sometimes overlapping) agendas of public health 
and population health genomic research.  Clinical ethics research into this process of translation is 
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necessary to ensure that public health disseminations and clinical interventions (i) mitigate genetic 
essentialist assumptions and challenge stigma towards particular diagnoses; (ii) maintain the 
personalised nature of therapeutic engagement with individuals and their particular experiences; 
(iii) keep sight of crucial socioeconomic structures which require reform to better prevent the 
development of mental disorders.    
 
2) The Relationships between Genetic and Psychosocial Models: Further work needs to be done to 
examine the complementarity between genomic approaches (including genetic counselling) and 
approaches shaped by psychosocial models of mental disorder.  This is not to suggest that genetic 
contributions are innately questionable ± indeed, the consensus is that further understanding of the 
genomic basis of serious mental illnesses, particularly in the field of epigenetics, could do much to 
enhance pre-existing evidence about the close interaction between genetic predisposition, 
psychological development, and environmental context.  However, more research is needed to 
explore the precise subjective impact of biogenetic attributions, particularly on its impact on 
conceptions of selfhood, responsibility, and agency which may have important consequences on 
the therapeutic alliance.  Additional work should clarify and critically analyse the differences and 
similarities between these two approaches, as well as consider ethical issues surrounding the 
clinical division of labor, addressing practical questions such as whether genetic risk counsellors 
should liaise with, or themselves be trained to provide, psychotherapeutic treatments.   
 
3) Clinician-Patient Relationship: The advent of genomic medicine and its integration in public 
health approaches generate key ethical questions about the changing nature of the clinician-patient 
relationship and the therapeutic encounter.  There needs to be further ethical examination of what 
these changes mean to individuals seeking mental health treatment and the normative foundation 
of the therapeutic alliance which aids successful recovery of mental disorder.  Indeed, the genomic 
revolution may reset the ethical parameters for clinical interventions.  Further research is needed to 
explore how these genomic approaches work at the clinical, therapeutic level, and to ensure that 
these approaches are ethically sound.   
 
4) Funding and Resource Allocation: Mental health research and treatments are critically 
underfunded in many countries.  The growing prioritisation of genomic research and therapies in 
mental health therefore requires ethical scrutiny and careful justification (Lewis-Fernandez et al, 
2016).  Further research needs to examine how governments, public health bodies, and mental 
health agencies should balance the funding demands for innovative genomic medicine and 







Growing developments in genomics has meant their increasing application mental health.  
Whilst this has some potential benefits there are challenges.  If the benefits of genomics for mental 
health are to be realised and the pitfalls avoided, these challenges, many of which are ethical, need 
to be identified, analysed and addressed.  In this paper we have identified a number of ethical 
challenges and set out an agenda for a programme of ethics research to complement 
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